The 2025 EU‑UK defence pact promised deeper cooperation, yet after a year and a half it remains far from a strategic partnership, revealing divergent priorities and procedural roadblocks.
The Security and Defence Partnership between the European Union and the United Kingdom was inked on 19 May 2025 with high expectations. Both sides highlighted the need for a renewed strategic dialogue, integration into the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), and a more vibrant defence-industry market.
At the time, the new British government, led by Prime Minister Keir Starmer, touted the agreement as a cornerstone of a broader “reset” with Brussels, while EU officials welcomed the prospect of tapping the United Kingdom’s considerable military and industrial capabilities.
Fast-forward eighteen months, and the partnership has barely moved beyond ceremonial statements. Dialogue streams at ministerial and technical levels have been opened, and the United Kingdom has re-joined the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) project on Military Mobility. Nevertheless, substantive collaboration on the CSDP, joint work with the European Defence Agency, and the long-awaited Security Action for Europe (SAFE) programme remain stalled, exposing a widening gap between ambition and reality.
Where the partnership is stuck
Two inter-linked dead-locks explain the current impasse. First, London appears primarily interested in projects that feed directly into its domestic defence industry, showing a willingness to take-part in European initiatives that generate contracts for British firms, while showing limited appetite for deeper commitment to the broader CSDP framework. Second, the EU and its Member States are bound by strict partnership rules that prevent a “Europe à la carte” approach; they are keen to keep third-country cooperation transparent and reciprocal, which clashes with the United Kingdom’s more transactional stance.
These dynamics have manifested in concrete failures. Negotiations on the SAFE programme — envisioned as a joint European response to emerging threats — have stalled at the funding and governance stage. Similarly, attempts to harmonise procurement standards with the European Defence Agency have produced only preliminary memoranda, without binding implementation. The result is a partnership that looks lively on paper but lacks the operational depth required for a genuine strategic alliance.
Why deeper cooperation matters now
The backdrop of Russia’s continued aggression in Ukraine and a perceived retreat of the United States from traditional European security guarantees heightens the urgency for a robust EU-UK defence link. Both parties possess capabilities that complement each other: the EU offers a large pool of integrated forces and a mature policy framework, while the United Kingdom brings cutting-edge technology, expeditionary experience, and a global defence footprint. Without a functioning partnership, both risk strategic isolation and diminished credibility on the world stage.
Moreover, the current security climate is unprecedented. A credible direct conflict with Russia, combined with hybrid threats emanating from non-state actors, demands coordination that exceeds bilateral or NATO-only mechanisms. A truly strategic partnership would enable rapid joint decision-making, shared intelligence, and coordinated industrial programmes that could accelerate the development of next-generation weapons and support services.
Pathways to a genuine strategic alliance
Realising a deeper bond will require adjustments on both sides. The EU would need to relax some of its partnership constraints, perhaps by creating a dedicated “EU-UK defence track” that allows more tailored arrangements while preserving the overall integrity of EU policy. In parallel, the United Kingdom must signal a willingness to contribute to collective European security beyond its own industrial interests, embracing joint CSDP missions and offering force contributions that match EU expectations.
Institutionally, establishing permanent liaison offices, joint budgeting mechanisms for selected projects, and a shared oversight body could institutionalise the cooperation that now drifts in and out of speeches. Such structures would not only streamline existing initiatives like Military Mobility but also pave the way for joint research and development programmes that address the dual challenges of great-power rivalry and technological disruption.
In the medium term, the debate should move beyond the original Security and Defence Partnership and focus on crafting a bespoke, high-level agreement that explicitly addresses the threats posed by both Moscow and Washington-time unpredictable policies. Only by recognising the partnership as an essential pillar of European security — alongside NATO and bilateral ties — can the EU and the United Kingdom transform a stalled agreement into a resilient, future-proof alliance.
