Gulf states want the UN to force an end to attacks, remove mines and guarantee the flow of ships and aid through the Strait of Hormuz
The Gulf Cooperation Council members and partners have taken a coordinated diplomatic step at the United Nations to address a rapid deterioration in maritime safety. Delegations led by Qatar, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates, working with Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United States, circulated a draft Security Council resolution that would require Iran to halt attacks on shipping, cease imposing so-called tolls and reveal the location and quantity of sea mines laid in the waterway.
The move aims to restore normal traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, the narrow chokepoint that carries about one fifth of global energy shipments and has become a focal point of the wider regional conflict.
The proposal links immediate security steps with humanitarian relief.
Co-sponsors insist the draft calls for Iran to engage with UN efforts to set up a humanitarian corridor that would let essential cargoes—fuel, fertiliser and aid—pass safely. The sponsors frame the request as rooted in international law and shared responsibility to preserve freedom of navigation.
Diplomats argue that ensuring passage is not a regional preference but a global economic necessity, especially as disruptions have driven insurance rates higher and left many seafarers stranded.
Key demands in the draft resolution
The circulated text reportedly compels Iran to stop attacks on commercial and civilian targets, to disclose and permit removal of naval mines, and to cease attempts to levy fees or otherwise obstruct shipping. It also backs establishment of a humanitarian corridor and warns of measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter should noncompliance continue. While the draft does not explicitly authorise military action, invoking UN Security Council mechanisms signals that a range of responses, from sanctions to additional steps, could be considered if the council adopts the text.
Legal and operational implications
Operating under Chapter VII gives the council authority to adopt binding measures; however, the text appears calibrated to avoid immediate language that would greenlight force. Instead, it focuses on concrete maritime steps: disclosure of minefields to enable clearance, protection of merchant vessels, and formal guarantees for lawful transit passage. Sponsors argue that such provisions are technical prerequisites for resuming pre-conflict shipping volumes and reducing the risk of accidental escalation.
Maritime disruption and economic fallout
The security crisis has translated into acute logistical and economic strains. Since the escalation that followed the 28 February strikes, the number of vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz has fallen sharply, with reports indicating roughly 1,600 ships were unable to pass amid heightened risk. Some Gulf producers have partially rerouted exports through pipelines that bypass the strait, but states like Qatar have faced severe export curbs. The situation has pushed up global energy prices and raised concerns about longer supply-chain effects for agriculture and industry.
Naval operations and blockades
Maritime dynamics have been further complicated by a mix of Iranian restrictions and US naval activity. Tehran has limited transit to vessels authorised by its forces and has been accused of laying mines. The United States has enforced a blockade on shipping to and from Iranian ports since 13 April, and it announced an initiative described as “Project Freedom” to escort ships out of restricted waterways after a 3 May social media post by the US President. CENTCOM and allied forces have increased patrols and interdictions, heightening the risk of direct encounters at sea.
Diplomatic contest and council prospects
Deep divisions at the Security Council complicate adoption of a unified response. An earlier draft sponsored by Bahrain was blocked when Russia and China used their vetoes, and Beijing and Moscow have since circulated an alternative text calling for an immediate cessation of hostilities. Sponsors of the new resolution have reportedly sought to avoid language that would immediately authorise force while preserving the council’s ability to act under Chapter VII. Negotiations among council members are ongoing, with back-and-forth over wording, thresholds for enforcement and the scale of measures that would follow noncompliance.
Positions outside the council remain polarized. US representatives condemned attempts to impose tolls and described maritime coercion as illegal, while Iran’s foreign ministry has argued that normal navigation will only resume if the larger conflict ends and sanctions are lifted, framing its actions as responses to external use of force. The diplomatic track—already strained after high-level talks in Islamabad on 11 and 12 April failed to bridge key differences—now faces the added pressure of rising attacks, including those on the UAE on 4 May, which regional governments have called unacceptable.
As negotiations continue, the central test will be whether the Security Council can translate technical maritime demands—mine disclosure, an operational humanitarian corridor, and guarantees for freedom of navigation—into a text that both deters further attacks and secures the consent or acquiescence of key powers. For states dependent on the strait’s throughput, the stakes are clear: restoring safe passage is essential to stabilise energy markets and prevent the conflict from inflicting wider economic harm.
